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IN 'THE SUPREME, COURT
of the
STATE OF UTAH
THALDA L. BAKER,
Plaintiff and Respondent,

-vs.-

Case No. 8550

ARCHIBALD H. COOK and MAY
K. COOK,
Defendants and Appellants.

APPELLANTS' BRIEF

STATE~1ENT

OF FACTS

This is an action brought by the plaintiff to recover
f.or personal injuries sustained while she was employed
to do general housework .at the ho1ne of the defendants.
On the morning of August 20, 1953, the defendant May
l{. Cook employed the plaintiff to do household cleaning
for her, and shortly after noon of that day, the plaintiff
came to the home of the defendants to begin work. The
first work that was required of her was to wash ground
floor windows on the outside of the apartment occupied
by the defendants. For this purpose the defendant May
K. Cook furnished plaintiff a ladder, which plaintiff
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took outside to begin work. Shortly thereafter the plaintiff re-entered the kitchen of the defendants' residence
and comp}ained that she had been injured, showing Mrs.
Cook a cut on her left leg. The foregoing are all of the
undisputed facts involved in this action, but there are a
number of other circumstances regarding which the parties are not in ~agreement.
Plaintiff's .testimony was to the effect that after she
had set up the ladder outside the window the defendant
~fay K. Cook looked out and suggested that plaintiff
turn the ladder .around the other way ··with the steps away
from the building (Tr. 18, 97).
Plaintiff denied that Ex. D-2± \\as the ladder that
she used on the day in question (Tr. 101, 147). Plaintiff
then testified that she had n1ounted the ladder to begin
work when she heard a c-racking noise, and the next thing
she knew, she was down on the ground on her hands and
knees ( Tr. 18-19). She then \vent b.aek into tl1e defendants' apartment and infor1ned the defendants of what
had occurred. She also testified tl1at after the accident
the rnetal portions of the ladder \rere so bent tl1at it
would not stand up, (Tr. 22) and that "~hen she put her
h.and on the ladder to help herself up the n1et.al bent
under her hand (Tr. 20-21, 103-105).
The defendant ~fay K. Cook testified at tl1e trial that
on the day in question she gave the plaintiff the ladder
introduced in evidenee as Exhibit D-24 to use and then
left the apartment "\\rhere she and the other defendant
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lived. When she returned the accident had already occurred, and she knew nothing about the manneT in which
plaintiff was injured ( Tr. 108-109). She also testified
that the ladder (D-24) was in substantially the s1ame
condition at the time of trial as it had been after the
accident and injury to plaintiff, and that both she and
other ele1aning women had used the ladder before the
accident and continued to use- it after the accident
( Tr. 109-110).
After .all of the evidence had been received, the court
submitted the matter to the jury upon genel}al instructions and the following special verdict:
"PROPOSITION No. 1: The defendants were
negligent in furnishing to the plaintiff a defective laddeT
which was not reasonably suited for the us.e to which it
had to be put by Mrs. Baker in doing her work.
"PROPOSITION NO. 2: The plaintiff was negligent in mounting the ladder afte:r she knew, or in the
exercise of reasonable care should have known, that it
was defective and not reasonably suited for the use to
\vhich it had to be put in doing her work.
"PROPOSITION NO. 3: The negligence of defendants, if found in Proposition No. 1, was a substantial
factor in proximately causing injury to Mrs. Baker.
"PROPOSITION NO. 4: The negligence of the
plaintiff, if found in Proposition No. 2, was a. substantial
factor in proximately causing injury to herself.

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

4
"QUESTION NO. 5: As shown by a preponderance of the evidence in this case, what amount of money
would fairly and adequately reoon1pense Mrs. Baker for
such injuries, if any, as were proximately caused by her
fall from the ladder¥
A.

General damages, if any

B.

Loss of earnings to date, if any

Total Damages
The jury 'vas instructed that they should answer
the first four propositions "True," '~False" or "Unable
to S.ay." All of the jurors answered propositions 1 and 3
"True," and seven of the1n answered numbers 2 and 4
•'1Jnable to Say." Thereupon the trial court ruled that
the defendant had failed in her burden of proof as to
plaintiff's contributory negligence and sent the jury out
to eonside·r proposition ~ o. 5. The jur~~ found general
da1nages in the amount of $5,000.00 loss of earnings in
the .an1ount of $2,500.00 for total of $7 ,500.00. To tllis
<unount the court added the sun1 of $1,818.~0 being mediral exp·ense to which the plaintiff l1ad testified.
After the jury had retired to eonsider the Inatter,
the court on 1nortion of counsel dis1nissed the case as to
the defendant Archibald H. Cook. This appeal is proseeuted by the other defendant :\lay I~. Cook, fron1 the
judgment rendered against her.
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STATEMEN'T OF POINTS
POINT I.
THERE IS NO EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT THE JURY'S
FINDING OF LOSS OF EARNINGS.

POINT II.
THE OOURT ERRED IN SUBMITTING PRO·POSITIONS
ONE TO FOUR INCLUSIVE TO THE JURY.

POINT III.
THE COURT'S RULING ON THE JURY'S FAILURE
TO ANSWER PROPOSITIONS TWO AND FOUR WAS
ERRONOUS.

POINT IV.
THE COURT ERRED IN FAILING AND REFUSING TO
SUBMIT TO THE JURY THE DEFENDANT'S THEORY OF
THE ,CASE.

POINT V.
THE COURT'S QUESTIONING OF THE JURY AFTER
THEY HAD RETURNED THEIR ANSWER TO PROPOSITION NO. 5 WAS PREJUDICIAL ERROR.

ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THERE IS NO EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT THE JURY'S
FINDING OF LOSS OF EAR.NINGS.

The only evidence as to the plaintiff's earnings was
plaintiff's own testimony to the effect that her average
yearly earnings for the three years immediately pre-
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ceeding the injury was "ab ou t $6'000.00 , or "about
Twenty-Three Hundred a year." (Tr. 12-13). Plaintiff
.also stated that she would produce records to substantiate
this statement (Tr. 13). It appeared after the noon recess that she was not able to locate any records at her
home (Tr. 106). When counsel inquired of the Federal
Bureau of Internal Revenue it appeared that the records
in question were not available there either (Tr.160). The
only .additional evidence having any bearing on the plaintiff's income was her own statement that she had been
unemployed for the three months immediately prior to
going to work for the defendants (Tr. 13, 86). On such
a state of the record any findings as to loss of earnings
is based solely on conjecture and supposition. Plaintiff's
employment history shows nm11erous changes in employment (Tr. 5-11), and even aillnitting that in the past
.average earnings had been ""about $2,300.00 a year," in
view of her own staten1ent as to having been unemployed
for three n1onths preceding the accident such yearly
income figures are without probative -v-alue as to her loss
of income since th·e accident.
As said by this Court in Seybold r.
Co., 121 Ut. 61, 239 P. (2d) 17 4:

l~nion

Pac. Ry.

"We h'ave no disagreen1ent ,,·ith the timehonored rule that if there is substantial evidence
to sup~port the conclusion of the trier of the fact
it will not be disturbed on revie\v. But that means
more than a 1nere scintilla of evidenee. See 9
·whigmore 3rd Ed., Sec. ~49-± . •.. If there is any
substantial con1petent evidence upon "Thic11 a jury
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acting fairly and reasonably could make the finding it should stand. But if the finding is s:o
plainly unreasonable as to convince the court that
no jury acting fairly and reasonably could make
the finding, it cannot be S'aid to be suppor.ted by
subs1tantial evidence."
To the s~ame effect is Wyatt v. Baughman, 121 Ut. 98,
239 P. (2d) 193.
Of course if it is determined that as a matter of law
the evidence does not support the finding of the jury,
it was error for the· trial court to submit the question
of loss of earnings to the jury. The defendant excepted
to the court's instruction No. 14 covering this issue
(Tr. 168).
POINT II.
THE COURT ERRED IN SUBMITTING PROPOSITIONS
ONE TO FOUR INCLUSIVE TO THE JURY.

Defendants' contention that the submission of these
propositions to the jury vvas error is based on two separate grounds: First that Proposition No. 1 ,as drawn
assumes facts in dispute; Second that by giving the jury
three alternatives in their answer, the Court permitted
them to answer the questions without deciding them.
We shall consider our first. ground of objection.
Proposition No. 1 states that defendants were: negligent
"in furnishing to the plaintiff a defective ladder ... " The.
question as to whether the ladder was defective was the
crux of the case, and by the use of the word "in" the
proposition assumes that the ladder furnished was de-
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fective, and that defendants were negligent. A similar
situation was before the court in Mass v. W. R. Arthur &
Co., 239 Wis. 581, 2 NW (2d) 238, where the trial court
submitted a question to the jury as to whether a driver
of an automobile was negligent "with respect to (a) in
attempting to overtake and p~as.s the car ... at the intersection ... " The court held that by the use of the word
"in" the special interrogatory assumed that the car was
p·assing at the inters.ection, and since this was one of the
questions in issue under the evidence, suc:h interrogatory
was erroneous ·as runounting to a comment on the evidence. This decision was cited with approval in Huffman
v. Reinke, 268 Wis. 489, 67 N.W. (2d) 871, where the court
said that where a question as framed assumes that one
of the parties was negligent, it should not be given.
In Foemmel v. llfueller, 255 Wis. 277, 38 NW (2d)
51 0, the special verdict given by the c,ourt \vas :
"Question 3.
•'Iuunediately preceding and at the time of the
accident involved here, "-ras the defendant Charles
l\iueller negligent in respect to ~\... . .
"B. In stopping on the high,Yay in the place
he did with:out placing burning fusees or flares
upon the road near his standing truck~
"C. In failing to haYe clearance lights burning upon the truck!"
Speaking of the special question.s, the eourt said:
"They are defective be·c.ause in Question 3-B
by the use of the word 'in' just preceding the word
'stopping' the 1neaning of the question is sucl1 that
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it assumes Mueller did fail to place burning fusees
or flares while stopping on the highway. Inste.ad,
the court should have submitted the direct question whether 'Mueller was negligent in stopp~ing
without placing' such fusees or flares.
"Likewise Question 3-C is defective be~cause
by using the word 'in' just preceding the words
'failing to have clearance lights burning' the meaning is such that the question assumes Mueller did
fail to have such lights. There should have been
submitted the direct question whether Mueller
was negligent in failing to have clearance lights
burning. . . . " Citing 1lfaas v. W. R. Arthur &
Co., supra.
The situation here is similar to one that was before
the court in Thoresen v. Grything, 264 Wis. 487, 59 N'V
(2d) 682. This was a case involving a rear end collision
between a truck and a car driven by one Grything, and
was submitted to the jury on a special verdict. The court
said:
"The real issue with respect to the conduct of
Grything was not submitted to the jury. It might
be inferred that the jury in considering its answer
t~o the question concerning his control of his car
might have concluded that there was no sudden
stopping. The inference might be permitted if the
court had instructed the jury with resp.ect to
Grything's duty as to stopping.
" 'The questions should be fr~amed so far .as
practicable to secure the most direct consideration
of the evidence as it applies to the issues made by
the pleadings and supported by the evidence.'
Liberty Te.a Co. v. L~aSalle Fire, Ins. Co., 206 Wis.
639, 238 N.W. 399."
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As in the Grything case cited above, the re.al issue
with respect to the conduct of the defendant M:ay K. Cook
was never submitted to the jury. The questions which the
jury should have decided were firstly, whether the ladder
(Ex. D-24) was the ladder used by plaintiff, secondly,
whethe;r it was defective, and thirdly, whether the defendants knew, or should have known that it was defective. Proposition No. 1 as fr.amed by the court ignores
all of these matters and assumes that the ladder was defective and that the defendants were negligent.
As said by this court in Sta'rtin v.ltladse·n 120 Ut. 631,
237 P. ( 2) 834, "The instructions should not be susceptible
of misconstruction as either comments on the evidence
or arguments for either side of the case."
As to the second ground of defendant's objection
to the submission of the first four propositions to the
jury the defendant respectfully submits that as drawn,
the propositions enable the jury to evade their duty
and still return answers to the questions.
The purpose of special interrogatories and special
verdicts is to give the parties and the court an opportunity to 'ascertain 'vhether the jury l1as understood and
applied the law to the proven facts, Elio L·. Akron Tra·nsp.
Co., l-t-7 Oh. St. 363, 71 N.E. (2d) 707. The defendant subInits that the propositions given to the jury by the trial
court fall short of this criterion. They ru.~ not "so clear
and concise as to be readily understood by the jury, and
... so framed as to call for a sin1ple categorical ans"\Yer."
53 An1. Jur., page 7±1, Sec. 1070. See also Scott r.
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Cismadi, SO Oh. Ap. Rep. 39, 74 N.E. (2d) 563, holding
that each interrogatory submitted to a jury should be
limited to a single direct and controverted issue of fact
and should be so stated that the ansvver will necessarily
be positive direct and intelligible.
Although counsel h.as done extensive research on this
1natter we have been unable to find at single case where
an appellate court has passed on special interrogatories
or a special verdict framed as were the court's Propositions one to four in this case, using the third .alternative.
With the growing use of special verdicts by the trial
courts of this state the question is one of importance
upon which this Court should pass for the guidance of.
the trial courts, and members of the bar.
The matters embraced in Propositions 2 and 4 were
issues vital to the success or failure of plaintiff's casethe matter of contributory negligence and proximate
cause. To submit such questions to the jury with an
jnstruction that they may ansvver that they are "Unable
to Say" is to invite members of the jury to shirk their
sworn duty to pass upon the evidence and decide the
facts. ·under the court's instructions they may answer
all of the propositions and still not decide the issues.

POINT III.
THE COURT'S RULING ON THE JURY'S FAILURE
T'O ANSWER PROPOSITIONS TWO AND FOUR WAS
ERRONOUS.

Researeh shows that the numerical weight of authority in the country is to the contrary of the above proposi-
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tion. However, in most states there have been statutes
enacted, or rules of procedure promulgated, which require such a decision. Without a careful ·analysis of the
statutes or proce;dur.al rules under which decisions were
rendered, it is impossible to determine whether they are
in point under the 1Jtah Rules of Procedure.
Courts in Texas have uniformly held in accord with
defendant's contention. An early case 'vas Goggan t·.
Wells ]?argo & Co. (C.C.A. Tex. 1920) 227 S.W. 246,
which holds that when the jury answered several material
special issues 'Unable to Answer' this amounted to no
answer at all. It was error for the court to enter a judgment on such verdict. The court in its opinion cites as
statutory authority for such holding ..~._\rticle 1988
Vernon's Sayles' Texas Civil Statutes, 1914. Tbis section
simply provides: "The verdict shall comprehend the
whole issue or all the issues submitted to the jury-." The
statute has been carried forward and is .a part of Rule
290 Texas Rules of Civil Procedure. This rule reads:
" . .~. verdict is a 'vritten declaration by a jury
of its decision, con1prehending the whole or all
the issues sub1nitted to the jury, and shall be
either a general or special Yerdict, as directed,
" . hich shall be signed by the foren1an of the jury.
"A general verdict is one " ..hereby the jury
pronounces generally in fav·or of one or n1ore
partie~s to thP suit upon all or a11y· of the issues
submitted to it. A special Yerdict ·is one "Therein
the jury ~inds the facts only on issues made up
and subn11tted to the1n under the direction of the
court."
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Since the foregoing
ent from the provisions
Procedure, the decisions
as to lTtah procedure,
passed on the question.

rule is not substantially differof Rule 49 Utah Rules of Civil
of the Te~as courts are in point
the Utah Court having never

The rule laid down in the Wells Fargo case, supra,
has been uniformly followed in Texas. In Lakewood
Heights Co. v. McCuist,ion (CCA Tex. 1921) 226 S.W.
1109, it was held:
". . . when a cause is submitted on special
issues, such issues must be determined by the jury.
In such case the court is powerless to decide any
issue so submitted. Differently stated, the court
in a jury trial in which special issues are submitted to the jury can only decide such issues as
have not been submitted and have not been requested to be submitted to the jury." citing cases.
In Nolan v. Smith, (CCA Tex. 1942) 166 S.vV. (2d)
750 the court said, quoting fro1n Adams v. Houston N at'l
Bank, Crex. Com. App.) 1 S.W. (2d) 878:
'' 'The constitutional right to a jury trial doe~s
not include those cases where, under the evidence:,
there is no controverted issue of fact for determination. In such a case there is nothing which
the court could submit to a jury and there is therefore no error in discharging the jury previously
impaneled and in rendering judgrnent in accordance with the undisputed facts.' " Citing also to
the same effect the case of Traders Etc., Co. v.
Weatherford, (Tex. Civ. App. 1939) 124 S.W. (2d)
423.
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Going on, the court quoted from the case of Copeland v.
Brannan, (Tex. Civ. App.) 70 S.W. (2d) 660:
" 'There was no finding of the jury on some
of the material questions presented, and having
submitted these issues to the jury, and the jury
not having found on them, the court was not authorized to supply such findings, nor to !ender
judgment on the issues answered, but should have
refused to accept the same ; and the jury should
have been returned for further consideration, and,
in c.ase they could not agree on such material
issues, a mistrial should have been declared. The
court had no authority to render judgment on the
verdict, absent any finding on such material issue
submitted.' "
The case of Texas E1nployers' Ins. Ass'n. v. Horn
(CC ...t\.. Tex.) 75 S.W. (2) 301, also cited the above language with approval. In Denison v. Brown, (CCA Tex.
1915) 172 S. ~T. 725, questions "~ere submitted to the jury,
and one remained unans,Yered. The trial court concluding
that the unanswered question 'Yas repetitious of one of
those answered and that therefore the factual question
had been decided, then rendered judg1nent. On appeal
this was reversed, the court holding that the fact of an
agreement on one question and inability to .agree on the
other 'vhen they both covered the srune factual situation
conclusively sho,ved that the jury did not correctly· understand the questions. Ren1anded for a ne,v· trial.
To the effect th-at 'vhere the jury fails to answer
special issues essential to the judgn1ent, a mistrial should
be declared, are.: Dato v. Geo. VV. ArJnstrong Co. (C. of
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li. Tex. 1924) 260 S.W. 1024; Cranston v. Gautier (CCA
Tex. 1926) 284 S.W. 620; Wheat v. Lancaster, (CCA Tex.
1926) 284 sw 629.
Spe-cial questions must be plain and unambiguous
and call for findings on questions of f.act which are conclusive of th'3 real issue. involved in the case. Farr v.
Haggerty, 273 ~fich. 547, 263 NW 739; Gilbert v. Stickley, 204 Mich. 342, 169 N.V\T. 866; JJ!Iiller v. James McGraw Co., 184 Md. 529, 42 A. (2d) 237.
In the case of Tober v. Pere Marquette R. Co., 210
:J'fich. 129, 177 N·w 385 the ~{ichigan Court held:
"A failure of the jury to answer a question
containing an affirmative fact essential to and
of some controlling force. in reaching a verdict
has been held to result in a mistrial." citing cases.
"The court should have instructed the jury it was
their duty to answer the special questions without permission to return divided answers or suggestion as to reporting how they stood if unable
to agree .and thus avoid a decision.''
In that case after the jury was instructed they returned
and asked further instruction as to the manner in which
they must answer the special questions. The court told
the1n that if all were unable to agree they should indicate
how many voted one way .and how many voted the other
and return the special verdict.
A slightly different approach to the problem was
used by the court in Laf1 ayette v. Bass, 122 Okla. 182,
252 .P. 1101 \vhere it -vvas said "Unable to Say" amounted
to a fajlure to .ans·w·er, and when the court without ob1
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jection from the parties accepted these answers and proceeded to enter judgment on the basis thereof, it amounted to a withdrawal of those issues from the jury. This,
the appellate court held, the trial judge had authority
to do under the. Oklahoma rules of procedure. The judgment w.as ·affirmed. Such would be the rule in Utah also,
since Rule 49 Rules of Civil Procedure sp.ecifically provides that failure by the party to demand submission of
an issue to the jury is a waiver of his right to a jury
determination on such issue. In this case, however, defendant requested submission to the jury of the issues of
contributory negligence and proximate cause embodied in
Propositions 2 and 4 by her requested instructions 2
(7) and 11. The authorities cited by defendant under
Point IV sho,ving the necessity for instructions to cover
all of the issues in the case are also controlling here.
Under this theory, the trial court failed to instruct the
jury on all issues of the case, "~hich is reversible error,
under the holdings of this court.
The l\{assachusetts eourt in Cote 'l;. Luce, 2~5 :Jfass.
123, 113 N.E. 777, held that failure of the jury to agree
on answers to special interrogatories does not amount
to a finding of fact. "'l,hese issues ... remain undeterInined." and in Stone r. Orth Chevrolet Co .. ~S-± ~Iass.
525, 187 N.E. 910, the court said that "?hile it is discretionary to require a special verdict, and no exception may
be taken to the court's granting or refusal to grant the
sa1ne, if a special verdict is ordered .and the ans,,~ers
given do not dispose of all 1naterial issues in the case it
is reversible error to di rert a verdict thereon.
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POINT IV.
THE COURT ERRED IN FAILING AND REFUSING TO
SUBMIT TO THE JURY THE DEFENDANT'S THEORY OF
THE ·CASE.

It has been the defendant's contention from the outset of this ease that plaintiff's injuries were due solely
to her own negligence in the manner in which she used
the ladder furnished her by the defendant. Whether she
slipped and fell from the ladder, or whether she faile·d
to set the ladder up properly and it tipped over, the defendant of course does not know. However, the defendant has contended from the beginning that the ladder
(Ex. D-24) did not collapse; that is, it did not break down
due to a failure in construction. To prove such contention, defendant herself testified th.at the ladder had been
used since the accident, both by herself and others (Tr.
109, 110, 116, 117). The witness Beth Christensen testified that she had used the ladder both before and since
the accident to plaintiff, (Tr. 123, 125). Defendant produced the ladder in court on the theory that an inspection
of it would be sufficient to eonvince anyone that the
ladder did not break down; that it did not bend as claimed
by the plaintiff. By requested Instruction No. 2 the defendant attempted to have these matters submitted to the
jury, but such instruction was refused by the court and
the jury did not have the opportunity to pass on the question of whether (Ex. D-24) was the ladder which plaintiff used; and whether the ladder used, (whether it was
D-24 or not) collapsed. The court's instructions erroneou:-~ly assumed that the only negligence with which plain-
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tiff could have been chargeable is in using a ladder which
she knew or should have known was unsafe. The instructions :completely ignore the fact that plaintiff m~ay have
so set up the ladder that it tipped over when she got on
it. This matter is controlled by the decision of this Court
in Startin v. Madsen, 120 Ut. 631, 237 P. (2d) 834, where
it was said :
"It w,as the duty of the trial court to cover
the theories of both parties in his instructions.
:&Iartineau v. H~anson, 47 U. 549, 155 P. -132; I\IcDonald v. U.P. Ry. Co., 109 U. 493, 167 P. (2d)
685."
When the instructions are considered as a whole as
they must be, Walkenhorst v. Kesler, 92 l~t. 312, 67 P.
(2d) 654; Redd v. Airway llfotor Coach Lines, 10-± lTt. 9,
137 P. (2d) 374; they do not measure up to the standard
laid down by this court in Startin v. 1lfadsen ~supra. Xor
does the trial court's procedure comply 'nth the rule
laid down by this Court in the case of In Re Hanson's
Will, 50 lTt. 207, 167 P. 256, "There it \Yas said:
"In this case the special verdict eovered eYery
issue, and therefore a general verdict "Ta.s unnecessary. In case a special verdict does not cover
ever~T issue~ tl1en, as a 1natter of eourse~ a general
verdict is neeessary to authorize .a judgment on
the verdict."
Since, the sperial Yerdict subn1itted by tl1e court did
not cover all of the issues in the ease, the rule laid down
by the llanson, ease, supra, requires that the trial cour.t
also sub1nit. a general verdict to the jury.
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POINT V.
THE COUR.T'S QUESTIONING OF THE JURY AFTER
THEY HAD RETURNED THEIR ANSWER TO PROPOSITION NO. 5 WAS PREJUDICIAL ERROR.

Pages 176 to 182 inclusive of the transcript cover
questioning of the jury by the court. This occurred ,afte.r
the jurors had returned their answer to proposition No.
5, and after counsel for the defendant had raised the
question that merely because the jurors were "Unable to
say" did not necessarily mean that they had not been
convinced by the evidence. The defendant respectfully
submits that a re.ading of this portion of the transcript
is sufficient to show that the trial court by adroit cross
questioning led the jurors to the conclusion that they
were not confused by the propositions, but were merely
unconvinced by the evidence. The court used leading
questions (lines 9, 14, 22 page 177; lines 11, 24 page 179;
lines 29-30 page 181). By commenting on questions which
counsel for the defendant wished to have asked, the court
nullified the effect of such questions before asking them.
(Tr. 180).
It should be noted that the first answers of the
jurors Gold (Tr. 176-177) and Dunn (Tr. 178-179) indicated that the questions had confused them, but that after
the tri.al judge cross examined these jurors and led them
by his questions they then concluded that the questions
had not confused them. Thereafter the other jurors
questioned went along with this statement.
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It should also be remembered that the jurors had
had a long and trying day. The events which occurr.ed in
those pages of the transcript took place after 9 P.M.;
(Tr. 175) after the jury had been out for more than
six hours (Tr. 164). After so long a deliberation and
at a rather late hour of the night, when the presiding
judge cross examines and questions the jurors in the
manner shown by the transcript herein, the result is a
foregone conclusion. Having once stated their position
the jurors would not easily recede from it, particularly in
the face of the comments and questions of the judge.
CONCLUSION
By way of sumn1ary, appellant urges that the judgment of the District Court is in error for the following
reasons:

1.

That there is no evidence to support any findIng of, or judgn1ent for, respondent's claimed loss of
earnings.
2. That the special verdir.t subnritted to the jury
was improper in that far.ts in dispute 'vere assu1ued by
the language of the verdirt. . AJso that the sperial \erdiet
was in error in per1nitting the jurors to return the answ~er
"Unable to Say'' to the questions posed.
3. That the jury having HnS'\Yered t'\vo of the questions in the special verdict ''Unable to S.ay·~ tJ1e trial
court should have declared a mistrial, since such answers
amount to no finding at all on the questions so ans'\\rered.
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4. That the trial court failed to instruct the jury on
the defendants' theory of the 0ase.
5. That the trial court committed reversible error
in its examination of the jurors after they had returned
their verdict.
For the foregoing reasons, appellant respectfully
urges that the judgment of the District Court he reversed
and that the case be remanded for a new trial.
Respectfully submitted,
HURD, BAYLE & HURD
1105 Continental Bank Building
Salt Lake City, Utah
HANSON & BALDWIN
520 Continental Bank Building
Salt Lake City, Utah
Attorneys for Appellant
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